Battle of Britain (1940): The RAF Against the Luftwaffe

The Battle of Britain was the air campaign fought over southern England and the English Channel between July and October 1940, in which the German Luftwaffe tried and failed to defeat the Royal Air Force. It was the first major campaign of the Second World War fought entirely in the air, and its outcome ended Hitler’s hopes of invading Britain in 1940.

Background

By late June 1940 Germany had conquered Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France. The British Army had escaped from Dunkirk but had left most of its heavy equipment behind, and Britain now stood without major allies in western Europe.

Hitler hoped Britain would negotiate. When Winston Churchill’s government refused, he issued Directive No. 16 on 16 July 1940, ordering preparations for a landing in southern England, codenamed Operation Sea Lion. The German navy was far weaker than the Royal Navy, so any crossing required air superiority over the Channel and the landing beaches. The task of winning it fell to the Luftwaffe under Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring.

Through the summer the Germans gathered river barges, tugs and transport ships in Channel ports from the Netherlands to Normandy. RAF Bomber Command and the Royal Navy attacked these concentrations, which became a visible sign of the threat to British observers.

The opposing forces

The Luftwaffe deployed three air fleets: Luftflotte 2 under Albert Kesselring and Luftflotte 3 under Hugo Sperrle in northern France and the Low Countries, and the smaller Luftflotte 5 under Hans-Jürgen Stumpff in Norway and Denmark. Together they had roughly 2,500 serviceable aircraft, including Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Bf 110 fighters, Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers and Heinkel, Dornier and Junkers twin-engine bombers.

RAF Fighter Command, led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, began the battle with around 600–700 serviceable fighters, mainly Hawker Hurricanes and Supermarine Spitfires. It was divided into groups: No. 11 Group under Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park defended London and the south-east and bore the brunt of the fighting, supported by No. 12 Group under Trafford Leigh-Mallory to the north and No. 10 Group in the south-west.

The Dowding system and radar

Britain’s great advantage was an integrated air-defence network, now often called the Dowding system. A chain of coastal radar stations, known as Chain Home, could detect aircraft forming up over France at ranges of up to about 100 miles. Inland, the volunteers of the Observer Corps tracked raids by eye and ear once they crossed the coast.

Reports flowed to the filter room at Fighter Command headquarters at Bentley Priory, then to group and sector operations rooms, where plotters moved markers on large map tables. Controllers ordered squadrons into the air and guided them by radio towards the enemy. The system meant British fighters rarely wasted time patrolling empty skies and could be concentrated against real threats.

Codebreaking also contributed, although its role in the battle itself is still debated. Intelligence from Enigma decrypts, produced at Bletchley Park, gave insight into Luftwaffe organisation, but real-time warning came mainly from radar.

What happened

Channel battles (July – early August)

From 10 July the Luftwaffe attacked convoys in the Channel and coastal ports, a phase the Germans called the Kanalkampf. These fights tested both sides and drew RAF fighters into combat over the sea, where downed pilots were harder to rescue.

The assault on the RAF (August – early September)

The main offensive, codenamed Adlerangriff (Eagle Attack), opened on 13 August, called Adlertag (Eagle Day). The Germans bombed radar stations, airfields and aircraft factories. On 15 August all three air fleets attacked, and Luftflotte 5’s raid from Scandinavia suffered heavy losses, ending its daylight role.

From 24 August to 6 September the Luftwaffe concentrated on No. 11 Group’s sector airfields, such as Biggin Hill, Kenley and Hornchurch. This was the most dangerous period for Fighter Command: airfields were badly damaged and experienced pilots were being lost faster than they could be replaced. The radar stations, however, proved hard to knock out, and the Germans did not persist in attacking them.

The switch to London (September)

On the night of 24–25 August German bombers dropped bombs on London, apparently by mistake. Bomber Command retaliated with a raid on Berlin, and Hitler publicly threatened revenge. On 7 September the Luftwaffe launched a huge daylight raid on London’s docks, marking the start of the Blitz.

The change of target gave the RAF’s airfields time to recover. On 15 September, now commemorated as Battle of Britain Day, two large German raids on London were met by massed RAF fighters, including Douglas Bader’s “Big Wing” from No. 12 Group. German losses that day were around 56–60 aircraft, far below British claims at the time but enough to show that the RAF was far from beaten. On 17 September Hitler postponed Sea Lion indefinitely.

The final phase (October)

Through October the Luftwaffe switched to fighter-bomber raids by day and growing night bombing. Daylight fighting slowly faded as the weather worsened, and 31 October is conventionally taken as the end of the battle.

Why the Luftwaffe failed

Several weaknesses undermined the German effort. The Bf 109 had enough fuel for only a short time over London, so bombers were often left poorly protected, and the twin-engine Bf 110 proved vulnerable to single-seat fighters. The Ju 87 Stuka, so effective in France, suffered such losses that it was withdrawn from the battle in mid-August.

German intelligence was poor. It underestimated British fighter production, misjudged the importance of radar and repeatedly reported that Fighter Command was down to its last few dozen aircraft. The Luftwaffe also changed its targets several times, from shipping to airfields to London, instead of pursuing one aim consistently.

Geography favoured the defenders. RAF pilots who baled out over England could fly again within hours, while German aircrew shot down over land were captured. Fighter Command, for its part, faced a serious shortage of trained pilots rather than of aircraft, and by early September many squadrons were exhausted.

Key people

• Sir Hugh Dowding: head of Fighter Command, architect of the defence system, who carefully conserved his fighters. He was replaced in November 1940.
• Keith Park: a New Zealander commanding No. 11 Group, whose tactical handling of squadrons was crucial.
• Trafford Leigh-Mallory: commander of No. 12 Group and supporter of the large “Big Wing” formations, a source of bitter debate with Park.
• Hermann Göring: commander of the Luftwaffe, who repeatedly overestimated German success.
• Lord Beaverbrook: Minister of Aircraft Production, who pushed fighter output to record levels.

The Few

On 20 August 1940 Churchill told the House of Commons: “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.” The aircrew of Fighter Command became known as “the Few”.

Around 3,000 airmen qualified for the Battle of Britain clasp. Most were British, but they also included Poles, Czechoslovaks, New Zealanders, Canadians, Australians, South Africans, Irish, Belgians, French and a handful of Americans. The Polish No. 303 Squadron, which entered combat in late August, was among the highest-scoring units. Behind the pilots stood thousands of ground crew, radar operators, plotters (many of them women of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force) and factory workers.

By the numbers

Figures vary between sources, partly because of how losses are counted.

British fighter production, around 450–500 a month in summer 1940, outpaced Germany’s, which helped Fighter Command replace its losses.

Myths and facts

• Myth: the RAF was hopelessly outnumbered. The Luftwaffe had more aircraft overall, but in single-seat fighters the two sides were closer than often thought, and Britain was out-producing Germany.
• Myth: the Spitfire won the battle. Hurricanes were more numerous and shot down more aircraft, although the Spitfire was better in fighter-against-fighter combat.
• Myth: claims of kills were accurate. Both sides greatly overestimated enemy losses; on 15 September the RAF claimed 185 aircraft, roughly three times the true figure.
• Fact: the battle alone did not stop an invasion. The Royal Navy’s strength in home waters was also a major deterrent.

Timeline

• 1940, 10 July: attacks on Channel convoys mark the conventional start of the battle.
• 1940, 16 July: Hitler issues Directive No. 16 for an invasion of Britain.
• 1940, 13 August: Adlertag, the start of the main German offensive.
• 1940, 15 August: all three Luftflotten attack; heavy German losses.
• 1940, 20 August: Churchill’s “so few” speech in the House of Commons.
• 1940, 24 August – 6 September: the critical attacks on RAF sector airfields.
• 1940, 7 September: first mass raid on London; the Blitz begins.
• 1940, 15 September: decisive daylight battles over London.
• 1940, 17 September: Hitler postpones Operation Sea Lion indefinitely.
• 1940, 31 October: the official British end date of the battle.

Why it matters

The Battle of Britain was Germany’s first major defeat of the war. It kept Britain in the fight as a base for the later bombing campaign and, in 1944, for the D-Day landings. It also showed the decisive value of radar and integrated air defence, lessons that shaped air warfare for decades.