Cuban Missile Crisis (1962): Thirteen Days on the Nuclear Brink

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1962 over Soviet nuclear missiles secretly installed in Cuba, 145 kilometres from Florida. For thirteen days, from 16 to 28 October, the two superpowers stood closer to nuclear war than at any other time in the Cold War. The crisis ended with a Soviet withdrawal, a US pledge not to invade Cuba and a secret American concession, and it reshaped how the superpowers managed the nuclear danger.

Background

After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961, Fidel Castro expected a new American attack, and the covert US campaign known as Operation Mongoose seemed to confirm his fears. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev pledged to defend Cuba, the first communist state in the Western Hemisphere.

Khrushchev also faced a strategic problem. The United States had far more long-range nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union, and it had deployed Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey, close to Soviet territory. Placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles in Cuba could quickly narrow that gap, as well as protect Castro.

In the spring of 1962 Khrushchev decided on a secret deployment, code-named Operation Anadyr. Castro agreed. From July, Soviet ships began carrying troops, equipment, R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads to Cuba. Some 40,000 to 43,000 Soviet military personnel were eventually sent, far more than US intelligence estimated at the time. They also brought short-range tactical nuclear weapons, whose presence was not known in Washington during the crisis.

Discovery and the US response

US intelligence had noticed the military build-up but believed the Soviets would not risk placing offensive missiles in Cuba. On 14 October 1962 a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Major Richard Heyser photographed western Cuba. Analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center identified medium-range ballistic missile sites near San Cristóbal.

On the morning of 16 October National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy informed President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy assembled a group of senior advisers that became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm. Its members included his brother Robert F. Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

The ExComm debated three main options: a surprise air strike on the missile sites, a full invasion of Cuba, or a naval blockade combined with diplomatic pressure. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially Air Force chief General Curtis LeMay, pressed for military action.

Kennedy chose the blockade as the first step. It left room for further pressure while giving Khrushchev time to back down. Because a blockade is legally an act of war, the administration called it a “quarantine” limited to offensive weapons.

On the evening of 22 October Kennedy revealed the missiles in a televised address. He announced the quarantine and warned that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be treated as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response.

The confrontation, 23 to 27 October

On 23 October the Organization of American States endorsed the quarantine. It came into force on 24 October. The same day the Strategic Air Command was raised to DEFCON 2, one step short of nuclear war, the only time it has reached that level. Several Soviet ships approaching the quarantine line stopped or turned back. On 26 October American sailors boarded the Marucla, a Lebanese-flagged freighter under Soviet charter, and let it continue after finding no weapons, a carefully chosen demonstration that the quarantine would be enforced without provoking a clash with a Soviet-flagged ship.

On 25 October, at the UN Security Council, US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson confronted his Soviet counterpart Valerian Zorin with reconnaissance photographs of the missile sites. Work on the sites in Cuba continued, however, and some missiles were assessed as operational.

On 26 October Khrushchev sent Kennedy a long, emotional private letter offering to remove the missiles if the United States promised not to invade Cuba. At about the same time an unofficial channel opened in Washington: a Soviet embassy official, Aleksandr Feklisov, met the ABC News correspondent John Scali and outlined a similar deal, which Scali passed to the State Department. The next day, a second, more formal message demanded in addition that the United States remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Saturday 27 October became the most dangerous day of the crisis. A Soviet surface-to-air missile shot down a U-2 over Cuba, killing Major Rudolf Anderson. Another U-2 strayed into Soviet airspace over Chukotka. At sea, US warships dropped practice depth charges to force Soviet submarines to surface; one of them, B-59, carried a nuclear-armed torpedo. According to later accounts, its captain considered using it, and the officer Vasili Arkhipov was among those who argued against launching.

The resolution

Kennedy decided to answer Khrushchev’s first letter publicly, accepting the offer of withdrawal in return for a no-invasion pledge. On the evening of 27 October Robert Kennedy met the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. He told him that the United States would remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey within a few months, but that this could not be part of any public agreement.

On the morning of 28 October Radio Moscow broadcast Khrushchev’s announcement that the missiles would be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union. Castro, who had not been consulted, was angered by the settlement and refused on-site UN inspections. US aircraft and ships verified the removal instead.

Further negotiations followed over Soviet Il-28 bombers in Cuba. After Khrushchev agreed to remove them, Kennedy lifted the quarantine on 20 November 1962. The Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from Turkey by April 1963.

Key people

• John F. Kennedy: the US president, who chose the quarantine and pursued a negotiated settlement.
• Nikita Khrushchev: the Soviet leader who ordered the deployment and then agreed to withdraw.
• Fidel Castro: Cuba’s leader, who accepted the missiles but was excluded from the final deal.
• Robert F. Kennedy: attorney general and the president’s key channel to the Soviet ambassador.
• Anatoly Dobrynin: Soviet ambassador in Washington, central to the secret negotiations.

By the numbers

Consequences

Publicly, the outcome looked like a clear American victory, and Kennedy’s standing rose. The Jupiter deal stayed secret for years, which reinforced the impression that Khrushchev had simply backed down. Within the Soviet leadership the episode damaged Khrushchev’s reputation, and it was one of the grievances raised when he was removed from power in October 1964.

Both governments drew lessons about the danger of miscalculation. In June 1963 they agreed to set up a direct communications link, the Moscow-Washington hotline. In August 1963 the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the first major arms control agreement of the nuclear age.

The Soviet Union also resolved never again to be so outmatched, and it embarked on a major build-up of its strategic nuclear forces. For Cuba, the no-invasion pledge helped secure Castro’s government, which remained in power for decades under US economic sanctions.

Much of what is now known emerged only decades later. At a series of conferences from the late 1980s that brought together former American, Soviet and Cuban officials, including one in Havana in January 1992, participants revealed details such as the presence of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons on the island. The release of ExComm tape recordings and Soviet archival documents in the 1990s further transformed historians’ understanding of the crisis.

Myths and facts

Myth: Khrushchev simply “blinked” and gave up for nothing. Khrushchev gained a US pledge not to invade Cuba and the secret removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The full terms only became widely known decades later.

Myth: the crisis was managed calmly and under full control. Later research showed many dangerous incidents that leaders did not fully know about at the time, including the submarine confrontations and the stray U-2 over Soviet territory.

Myth: all the Soviet weapons were detected. US intelligence did not know that tactical nuclear weapons were in Cuba during the crisis, nor how many Soviet troops were present.

Timeline

• 1962, spring: Khrushchev decides to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba.
• 1962, 14 October: A U-2 photographs missile sites near San Cristóbal.
• 1962, 16 October: Kennedy is briefed and the ExComm begins meeting.
• 1962, 22 October: Kennedy announces the missiles and the quarantine on television.
• 1962, 24 October: The quarantine takes effect; Strategic Air Command moves to DEFCON 2.
• 1962, 26 October: Khrushchev’s first letter offers withdrawal for a no-invasion pledge.
• 1962, 27 October: A U-2 is shot down over Cuba; Robert Kennedy meets Dobrynin.
• 1962, 28 October: Khrushchev announces that the missiles will be removed.
• 1962, 20 November: Kennedy lifts the quarantine after the Il-28 bombers are withdrawn.
• 1963, April: The last US Jupiter missiles are removed from Turkey.

Why it matters

The Cuban Missile Crisis is the clearest example of how close the world came to nuclear war during the Cold War. It showed both the risks of brinkmanship and the value of private channels and compromise. Its lessons led directly to the first steps in nuclear arms control and remain central to the study of crisis management today.