Hundred Regiments Offensive (1940): China's Communists Strike

The Hundred Regiments Offensive was the largest military campaign fought by the Chinese Communist Party’s Eighth Route Army against Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Between 20 August and 5 December 1940, around 105 regiments attacked Japanese-held railways, roads, coal mines and fortified posts across north China. The offensive damaged Japan’s grip on the region, but it also triggered some of the most brutal reprisals of the war.

Background

Japan invaded China on a full scale in July 1937 and by 1938 controlled the main cities and railway lines of north China. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Chongqing in the south-west, while the Communists, who had reached Yan’an after the Long March, built guerrilla base areas behind Japanese lines.

The Japanese held the railways with a dense network of blockhouses and garrisons. The Communists, in turn, controlled villages and hills between them. By 1940 the war had reached a stalemate, and Chinese morale was low after years of defeat, the fall of Wuhan and the horrors of the Nanjing Massacre.

Several pressures pushed the Communists to act. Japan was tightening its “cage” of roads, ditches and blockhouses around the base areas. There were fears that Chiang Kai-shek might seek terms with Japan. And the Communists were accused by critics of avoiding battle to save their strength for a later struggle against the Nationalists.

Planning the offensive

The plan was drawn up by Peng Dehuai, deputy commander of the Eighth Route Army, under Zhu De’s overall command. The main target was the Zhengtai railway, which linked Shijiazhuang in Hebei with Taiyuan in Shanxi and cut through the mountainous heart of the Communist base areas. Other targets included the Tongpu, Pinghan and Jinpu railways, connecting roads and the important Jingxing coal mines.

The operation was first planned with around 20 regiments. As local units joined in, the number grew to about 105 regiments, roughly 200,000 regular troops, which gave the campaign its name. Local militia and villagers helped by tearing up tracks, cutting telegraph lines and carrying supplies.

What happened

The first phase opened on the night of 20 August 1940. Communist units struck simultaneously along hundreds of kilometres of railway, blowing up bridges and tunnels, destroying stations and pulling up rails. The Jingxing coal mines, which supplied Japanese industry, were badly damaged and put out of production for months. Traffic on the Zhengtai line was halted for weeks.

The second phase, from late September into October, aimed at Japanese strongpoints that had survived the first attacks and at extending the damage to other lines and roads. Fighting around Laiyuan and Lingqiu in the north and Yushe and Liaoxian in the south was fierce and costly for the attackers, who lacked heavy artillery.

The third phase, from October to early December, was largely defensive. Japan’s North China Area Army, under General Tada Hayao, launched punitive sweeps into the base areas, and Communist forces fought to protect their headquarters and villages. The campaign is generally dated as ending on 5 December 1940.

One episode became famous in China. During the attack on the Jingxing area, Communist troops found two young Japanese girls whose family had been killed; Nie Rongzhen cared for them and arranged for them to be returned to the Japanese side.

Losses and results

Figures for the campaign are disputed. Communist sources claimed more than 20,000 Japanese and over 5,000 collaborationist troops killed or wounded, along with hundreds of kilometres of railway and many blockhouses destroyed. Japanese records give much lower losses. Communist casualties are usually put at around 17,000 to 22,000.

What is clear is that the offensive caused serious disruption and surprised the Japanese command, which had underestimated Communist strength. It also lifted morale in unoccupied China and strengthened the Communists’ claim to be leading resistance to Japan.

Consequences

The cost came later. From 1941, Japan adopted harsh “mopping-up” campaigns in north China, associated with General Okamura Yasuji. Chinese sources call this the Three Alls policy, “kill all, burn all, loot all”. Villages were burned, crops seized, and civilians killed or deported for forced labour. Blockade lines and ditches cut the base areas into pieces.

The population of the Communist base areas fell sharply, from around 44 million to about 25 million by commonly cited estimates, and the Eighth Route Army lost many troops. The Communists returned to small-scale guerrilla warfare and did not attempt another campaign of this size against Japan.

Legacy

Within the Communist Party the offensive became controversial. Mao Zedong had favoured conserving forces, and in 1959 and again during the Cultural Revolution, Peng Dehuai was accused of launching it without proper approval and of exposing Communist strength. Peng died in prison in 1974 and was rehabilitated after Mao’s death.

Today the offensive is commemorated in China as a major contribution to the war against Japan, with a memorial museum at Yangquan in Shanxi. Historians outside China see it as a real but costly blow that also shaped the Communists’ later preference for guerrilla warfare before the Chinese Civil War.

Timeline

• 1937, 7 July: Fighting at the Marco Polo Bridge begins full-scale war between China and Japan.
• 1940, 20 August: Communist forces launch coordinated night attacks on the Zhengtai railway and other lines.
• 1940, late August: The Jingxing coal mines are attacked and put out of action.
• 1940, 20 September: The second phase begins, targeting surviving strongpoints and roads.
• 1940, October: Japanese forces start large punitive sweeps into the base areas.
• 1940, 5 December: The campaign is generally considered to end.
• 1941: Japan intensifies its “mopping-up” operations across north China.

Why it matters

The Hundred Regiments Offensive showed that Communist forces could strike Japan on a large scale, but its consequences pushed them back to guerrilla warfare. It shaped both the wartime experience of north China’s villages and the later political fate of Peng Dehuai.