July Crisis of 1914: How Europe Stumbled Into World War I

The July Crisis was the five-week chain of decisions, ultimatums and mobilisations that turned the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 into a general European war by 4 August. Statesmen in Vienna, Berlin, St Petersburg, Paris and London each made choices that raised the stakes, while rigid military timetables narrowed the room for diplomacy. Its causes remain among the most debated questions in modern history.

Background: a divided continent

By 1914 Europe’s great powers were split into two blocs. Germany, Austria-Hungary and, nominally, Italy formed the Triple Alliance; France and Russia were formal allies, and Britain had looser understandings with both, together known as the Triple Entente. An arms race, colonial rivalries and repeated crises in Morocco and the Balkans had raised tension for a decade.

The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 made Serbia larger and more confident, and convinced many in Vienna that Serbian nationalism threatened the survival of the multinational Habsburg empire. When Bosnian Serb conspirators armed in Serbia carried out the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the Austro-Hungarian leadership saw a chance to settle accounts with Serbia once and for all.

Other calculations also played a part. German leaders feared that time was against them, as Russia’s army and strategic railways were growing under a large rearmament programme due to be completed around 1917. Serbia, by contrast, was exhausted by the Balkan Wars, and its government under Prime Minister Nikola Pašić was anxious to avoid another conflict so soon.

The blank cheque

Austria-Hungary would not move without its ally. On 5 July 1914 Count Alexander Hoyos, an official of the foreign ministry, brought a letter from Emperor Franz Joseph to Berlin. Kaiser Wilhelm II, and on 6 July Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, assured Vienna of Germany’s full support for firm action against Serbia, even at the risk of war with Russia. Historians call this promise the blank cheque.

In Vienna the foreign minister, Count Leopold Berchtold, and the chief of the general staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, pressed for war. The Hungarian prime minister, István Tisza, at first opposed an attack but was won over by mid-July. To avoid alarming Europe, the government took its time and kept its intentions secret.

The ultimatum to Serbia

The ultimatum was deliberately delivered on the evening of 23 July, just after the French President Raymond Poincaré and Prime Minister René Viviani had left a state visit to St Petersburg, so that the two allies could not easily coordinate a response. It gave Serbia 48 hours to accept ten demands, including the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda and organisations and the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in suppressing the conspiracy and investigating it inside Serbia.

Serbia’s reply on 25 July was conciliatory in tone and accepted most of the points, but it refused to allow Austro-Hungarian officials to take part in a judicial inquiry on Serbian soil. Serbia had already ordered mobilisation earlier that day. Austria-Hungary declared the answer unsatisfactory, broke off diplomatic relations and on 28 July declared war on Serbia. Austro-Hungarian guns began shelling Belgrade that night.

From local war to general war

Russia regarded itself as the protector of Serbia and would not accept its humiliation. From 26 July it began secret pre-mobilisation measures, announced a partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary on 29 July and, after Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov persuaded Tsar Nicholas II, ordered general mobilisation on 30 July. Personal telegrams between the Tsar and the Kaiser, the “Willy–Nicky” telegrams, failed to stop the slide.

German military planning required a rapid attack on France through Belgium before Russia’s huge army was ready, so Russian mobilisation was treated as an act of war. On 31 July Germany proclaimed a “state of imminent danger of war” and sent ultimatums to Russia and France. Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August, the same day France and Germany ordered general mobilisation, and declared war on France on 3 August.

The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had proposed a conference of the powers, but the idea found no support in Berlin or Vienna. The British cabinet was divided until Germany demanded passage through Belgium on 2 August. The German invasion of Belgium on 4 August decided the matter, and Britain’s ultimatum to Germany expired at 11 p.m. London time that night. Grey later recalled remarking that the lamps were going out all over Europe.

Public opinion and the last days of peace

While diplomats negotiated, much of the European public paid little attention until the last week of July. The summer holidays were in full swing, and the Austrian ultimatum came as a shock. In the final days large crowds gathered in Berlin, Paris, London and St Petersburg. Older accounts spoke of universal enthusiasm for war, but more recent research shows that reactions ranged from patriotic excitement in city centres to anxiety and resignation in the countryside and among workers.

Socialist parties across Europe had promised to oppose war, and large anti-war demonstrations took place in late July. On 31 July the French socialist leader Jean Jaurès, one of the most prominent voices for peace, was shot dead in a Paris café by a young nationalist, Raoul Villain. Within days most socialist parties, including the German Social Democrats, voted for war credits, and in France the parties joined a “sacred union” (union sacrée) for national defence.

There were last attempts at mediation. On 28 July the Kaiser suggested that Austria-Hungary should halt after occupying Belgrade and then negotiate, an idea Grey also put forward. Vienna did not take it up, and Russia’s general mobilisation soon overtook the diplomacy. Italy, though formally allied to Germany and Austria-Hungary, declared its neutrality at the start of August, arguing that the alliance was defensive and that it had not been consulted; it entered the war against Austria-Hungary in May 1915.

Key people

• Leopold Berchtold (1863–1942): Austro-Hungarian foreign minister who drafted and sent the ultimatum.
• Wilhelm II (1859–1941): German Kaiser, who gave the blank cheque but wavered at the end of July.
• Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1856–1921): German chancellor, who hoped to localise the war but accepted the risk of a wider one.
• Sergei Sazonov (1860–1927): Russian foreign minister, who pushed for mobilisation in support of Serbia.
• Sir Edward Grey (1862–1933): British Foreign Secretary, who tried mediation and then led Britain into the war.

Timeline

• 1914, 28 June: Archduke Franz Ferdinand is assassinated in Sarajevo.
• 1914, 5–6 July: Germany gives Austria-Hungary the blank cheque.
• 1914, 23 July: Austria-Hungary delivers its ultimatum to Serbia.
• 1914, 25 July: Serbia replies; Austria-Hungary breaks off relations.
• 1914, 28 July: Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia.
• 1914, 30 July: Russia orders general mobilisation.
• 1914, 1 August: Germany declares war on Russia; France mobilises.
• 1914, 3 August: Germany declares war on France.
• 1914, 4 August: Germany invades Belgium; Britain declares war on Germany.

Debate and legacy

After the war, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles placed responsibility on Germany and its allies, a judgement Germans bitterly rejected. In the 1960s the German historian Fritz Fischer argued that Germany’s leaders had deliberately risked, and even sought, a great war. More recent historians, notably Christopher Clark in The Sleepwalkers (2012), emphasise shared responsibility and the mutual misjudgements of all the powers.

Most scholars agree on some points. Austria-Hungary chose war with Serbia, Germany encouraged it, Russia’s mobilisation widened it, and the German plan to attack France through Belgium made a continental war almost certain to draw in Britain.

Why it matters

The July Crisis is the classic example of how alliances, military planning and miscalculation can turn a local crisis into a catastrophe. Its lessons about escalation, deterrence and diplomacy are still studied by historians and political leaders today.