Remilitarisation of the Rhineland (1936): Hitler's First Gamble

The remilitarisation of the Rhineland took place on 7 March 1936, when Nazi Germany sent troops into the demilitarised zone along its western border. The move broke both the Treaty of Versailles and the freely negotiated Locarno Treaties. Britain and France protested but did nothing to reverse it, and the episode greatly strengthened Hitler’s position at home and abroad.

Background

The Rhineland is the region of western Germany on both sides of the River Rhine, including cities such as Cologne, Düsseldorf and Mainz. After the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 banned German troops and fortifications on the left (western) bank of the Rhine and in a 50-kilometre strip on the right bank. Allied troops occupied parts of the region until June 1930.

In the Locarno Treaties of 1925, Germany voluntarily accepted its western borders and the demilitarised zone. Britain and Italy acted as guarantors: if Germany committed a “flagrant” violation, they promised to help France and Belgium. For French security planners, the open Rhineland was a vital buffer that allowed the French army to strike into Germany if it threatened France’s eastern allies.

After 1933 Hitler steadily dismantled the Versailles settlement. Germany left the League of Nations in October 1933, announced the existence of an air force and the return of conscription in March 1935, and signed a naval agreement with Britain in June 1935. The Rhineland was the next obvious target.

Why Hitler acted in March 1936

The timing reflected an opportunity. Britain and France were divided by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, which had wrecked the Stresa Front, their 1935 agreement with Italy to resist German treaty breaches. Mussolini, isolated by League sanctions, had signalled that he would not object.

Hitler’s pretext was the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed in May 1935 and ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies on 27 February 1936. Germany argued that this treaty was incompatible with Locarno. Hitler’s generals were nervous, since the German army was still in the early stages of rearmament, but he chose to gamble that the Western powers would not fight.

What happened on 7 March

The operation was given the cover name Winterübung (“Winter Exercise”). Early on Saturday 7 March 1936, German troops marched into the zone; crowds greeted them with flowers in Cologne and other cities. Most units stopped on the right bank, while only three battalions crossed to the left bank, advancing towards Aachen, Trier and Saarbrücken. Including armed police absorbed into the army, the force in the zone numbered in the tens of thousands, far fewer than French intelligence believed.

The same day Hitler spoke to the Reichstag. He denounced the Franco-Soviet pact and declared Locarno void, but in the same speech offered new peace proposals, including non-aggression pacts with Germany’s western neighbours and a possible return to the League of Nations. The offer was designed to make resistance seem unreasonable.

The French and British response

France was in the middle of an election campaign, with voting due in late April and early May. Prime Minister Albert Sarraut made a firm radio broadcast on 8 March, declaring that France would not leave Strasbourg exposed to German guns. However, the army chief, General Maurice Gamelin, advised that any action would require general mobilisation, which the cabinet considered politically and financially impossible. France reinforced its frontier positions but did not move into the zone.

Foreign Minister Pierre-Étienne Flandin sought British support. The British government of Stanley Baldwin, with Anthony Eden as foreign secretary, was unwilling to risk war over what much of British opinion saw as Germans entering their own territory. The Locarno powers met in London, and the League Council there declared on 19 March 1936 that Germany had violated its treaty obligations, but no sanctions followed.

Key people

• Adolf Hitler (1889–1945): German dictator who took the decision, against the caution of many of his generals.
• Werner von Blomberg (1878–1946): war minister and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, who issued the orders for the operation but was anxious about a French response.
• Albert Sarraut (1872–1962): French prime minister during the crisis, heading a caretaker-style government before the elections.
• Pierre-Étienne Flandin (1889–1958): French foreign minister, who sought British backing for firm action and did not obtain it.
• Anthony Eden (1897–1977): British foreign secretary, who condemned the breach but worked to prevent a war and to open talks with Germany.
• Maurice Gamelin (1872–1958): French army chief, whose overestimate of German strength made military action seem too dangerous.

Public opinion in Britain and France

British public opinion was largely unwilling to fight. Many Britons felt that Versailles had been too harsh and that Germany was doing no more than restoring control over its own territory. Pacifist feeling was strong: the Peace Ballot organised by the League of Nations Union in 1934–1935 had gathered more than 11 million responses, most of them supporting collective security through the League but few eager for war. Britain’s own rearmament was only just beginning.

In France, the country was politically polarised and economically weakened by the Depression. The Popular Front coalition of left-wing parties was expected to win the coming elections, and few politicians wanted to begin a war in the middle of a campaign. Newspapers of both left and right were cautious, and the defensive mindset symbolised by the Maginot Line made an offensive into Germany seem alien to French strategy.

Myths and facts

Myth: Germany’s army was ready to fight France. The Wehrmacht in 1936 was far weaker than the French army. Hitler himself later said that the first days after the move had been among the most nerve-racking of his life.

Myth: German troops had firm orders to withdraw at the first shot. Contingency plans did exist for falling back to defensive positions if France attacked, but historians disagree on how far and how quickly Germany would actually have retreated. The popular idea of a guaranteed immediate withdrawal is a simplification.

Consequences

The remilitarisation was a turning point. On 29 March 1936 a Reichstag “election” with a single list of candidates, presented as a vote on Hitler’s policy, produced an official result of 98.8 per cent approval. Hitler’s prestige with his generals and the German public rose, and his confidence in his own judgement grew.

The strategic balance shifted against France. Germany began fortifying its western border, work that later became the Westwall, which Allied soldiers called the Siegfried Line, making it harder for France to help allies such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. In October 1936 Belgium ended its military alliance with France and returned to neutrality. Within two years Hitler carried out the Anschluss with Austria and gained the Sudetenland through the Munich Agreement.

Timeline

• 1919, 28 June: The Treaty of Versailles demilitarises the Rhineland.
• 1925, 1 December: The Locarno Treaties are formally signed in London.
• 1930, 30 June: The last Allied occupation troops leave the Rhineland.
• 1935, 2 May: France and the Soviet Union sign a mutual assistance treaty.
• 1936, 27 February: The French Chamber ratifies the Franco-Soviet treaty.
• 1936, 7 March: German troops enter the Rhineland; Hitler declares Locarno void.
• 1936, 19 March: The League Council finds Germany in breach of its treaties.
• 1936, 29 March: Single-list Reichstag election endorses Hitler’s policy.

Why it matters

The Rhineland crisis is often seen as the last cheap opportunity to stop Hitler, when the military balance still clearly favoured France. Whether firm action would have toppled him is debated, but the failure to act showed that the Western powers would not enforce the peace settlement. It set the pattern of appeasement that continued until 1939.